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Abstract: We use individual data on browsing histories combined with survey data to examine 
whether online news exposure exhibits signs of segregation and selectivity. By using online news 
behaviour combined with survey reports of attitudes, we can capture exposure to both traditional 
news sources and news shared via social media platforms. Most importantly, we can also examine 
what types of individuals (e.g. partisans, educated) are more likely to exhibit selective 
tendencies. We find, consistent with recent empirical work, the extent of segregation in exposure 
may be overstated. Furthermore, the degree of segregation and selectivity varies across groups 
that are defined by holding shared political preferences. For example, in the case of Brexit, those 
who supported the ‘Leave’ side were more selective in their news exposure. Our approach allows 
comparison of news exposure patterns by domains versus news exposure to topics. To our 
knowledge, this is the first analysis to allow this comparison. 
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Normative theories of democracy suggest that, to function effectively, citizens should have 
access to a variety of sources of information (Downs, 1957). Ideally, citizens form their preferences 
and understand the preferences of others through exposure to information from a variety of 
viewpoints. As the dominant source of political information for citizens, there seems to be little 
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question that the media matter as providers of information in politics in general and in elections in 
particular. However, the media landscape has changed— 
more people are accessing news online (both web-based versions of legacy news sources and ’digital 
native’ sources), social algorithms direct users to news and information (e.g. filter bubbles), and 
news and information is shared via social media.  
As the internet has become a dominant platform for disseminating news and information, 
individuals are faced with a wider range of options (from social and traditional media), new patterns 
of exposure (socially mediated and selective), and alternate modes of content production (such as 
user-generated content) (Valkenburg, Peter, & others, 2013). One of the important questions that 
researchers are grappling with is whether this development has increased exposure to different 
viewpoints or whether it has led citizens to a narrower range of viewpoints. While initially thought 
to democratize access to information, there is now conflicting evidence on how the use of the internet 
and social media influence public opinion (Bode, 2015; Boulianne, 2015; Sudulich, 2011).  The 
empirical evidence about selectivity and about the impact of online news consumption on voters’ 
attitudes and behaviour is far from conclusive, and scholars have been cautious in making claims 
about the impact of the internet on increased selectivity (Quintelier & Vissers, 2008; Tucker et al., 
2018). The conclusion that “people restrict themselves to their own points of view” (Sunstein, 2004, 
p. 4) may be overstated. Despite the lack of consensus over the direction and size of effects, there 
have been advances in terms of conceptualizing the nature of media influence (Bennett & Iyengar, 
2008; Iyengar & Simon, 2000) and the methods used to study them. 
Our analysis of patterns of news exposure proceeds as follows: We first situate our contribution 
in the ongoing debate about segregation in online news exposure. We then present details on data 
collected around the EU Referendum vote in Great Britain in 2016. In order to assess the attitudinal 
basis of selectivity and segregation, we combine the online browsing histories with an online panel 
survey. We are then able to analyze how segregated the news consumption is of “Leave” and 
“Remain” voters by using indicators of the content of news domains and news stories. Our findings 
suggest that predispositions and preferences are linked to different news consumption patterns, 
with some citizens exhibiting a greater degree of segregation. However, the news consumption 
patterns exhibit a great deal of overlap. In particular, public service broadcasting (BBC) represents 
a shared news experience. 
1. Echo Chambers or the Marketplace of Ideas: Online News Consumption 
One of the central questions about the effect of the technological changes on how citizens access 
news is whether the developments have contributed to increased polarization or segregation (i.e. 
exposure to a narrower range of views) in the citizenry. On the one hand, many have argued along 
with Sunstein (2009) that when given more options, individuals will choose to consume content that 
fits with prior beliefs. Thus, they are creating “echo chambers” —views reflecting the narrow range 
of views to which they choose to be exposed.1 The lack of exposure to a variety of viewpoints might 
                                                     
1 V.O. Key in The Responsible Electorate describes public opinion as but an “echo…the output of 
an echo chamber bears an inevitable and invariable relation to the input. . . the people’s verdict can 
be no more than a selective reflection from the alternatives and outlooks presented to them” (Key, 
1966). The term is now used to describe the process by which individuals ‘echo’ views that are 
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increase ideological segregation in news consumption and lead to polarization in the electorate 
(Tewksbury & Riles, 2015).  
The ‘motivated reasoning’ and ’confirmation bias’ paradigms suggest that citizens will tend to 
resist information that is inconsistent with prior beliefs and values, and seek out information that 
confirms them (Kunda, 1990). Individuals, in controlled experiments, choose news articles aligned 
with their political interests (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). They are also more likely to share information 
that conforms to their opinion in their networks and to interact with others that share their opinions 
(Schkade, Sunstein, & Hastie, 2007). There is evidence that these biases are replicated in online 
behaviour. Quattrociocchi (2016), for example, attributes decisions to promote a particular narrative 
on social media to confirmation bias. Other studies concur that the internet and social media 
reinforce predispositions through selective exposure. Individuals prefer or opt for partisan sources 
over sources that offer a variety of views (Mutz, 2001) and seek out websites that advance their views 
(Bimber & Davis, 2003). Aside from selective exposure, algorithms used by search engines, news 
aggregators, and social media sites ‘personalize’ a user’s experience, and promote information and 
opinions that conform to and reinforce opinions creating ‘filter bubbles’ (Dillahunt, Brooks, & 
Gulati, 2015).  
For others, the internet represents the marketplace of ideas or the public sphere realized online. 
By removing media conglomerates as the gatekeepers of what is newsworthy, the internet and social 
media open up the potential for citizens to access a wider range of views. Exposure to this wider 
range of viewpoints may be intentional or accidental. For example, accessing news and information 
online leads to inadvertent exposure to diverse and sometimes contradictory viewpoints, which, in 
turn, contributes to heterogeneity in political discussion (Brundidge, 2010). Intentional exposure to 
more diverse views depends on existing networks and predispositions. Individuals who have more 
heterogeneous networks seek out more information on diverse topics (Scheufele, Hardy, Brossard, 
Waismel-Manor, & Nisbet, 2006) and are more aware of opposing viewpoints (Mutz, 2002). This is 
in contrast to the extreme positions adopted by those in homogeneous networks (Mutz, 2001; 
Sunstein, 2009).  
Thus, there seems to be sound arguments and evidence to support both sides of the debate about 
the effect of online news consumption on democratic deliberation. However, there is a growing body 
of evidence to suggest that not all online news consumption is alike. First, many of the studies that 
demonstrate echo chambers are based on analyzing exposure to and sharing of information on social 
media platforms. Based on examining patterns of clicking through to and sharing stories on 
Facebook, Bakshy et al. (2015) conclude that user selectivity, when compared to stories appearing 
on a news feed determined by algorithms, had a bigger impact on narrowing exposure. Likewise, 
echo chambers have been demonstrated on Facebook, Twitter, and blogs across a range of topics 
(Adamic & Glance, 2005; Colleoni, Rozza, & Arvidsson, 2014; Halberstam & Knight, 2016; 
Quattrociocchi et al., 2016; Williams, Cioroianu, & Williams, 2016). However, there is persuasive 
evidence that ‘weak ties’ (connections to those outside ones immediate network of friends), which 
have not been examined in previous research work, expose users to more heterogeneous views 
(Barberá, 2014). The extent of agreement among even those within immediate networks may be 
overestimated, with agreement resulting from projection rather than true similarity (Goel, Mason, 
                                                     
similar to their own, as no other views are selected to enter the ‘chamber’. 
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& Watts, 2010). Further, analysis across a number of countries shows that online news communities 
are not any more fragmented than other online communities (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017).  
Second, despite this evidence for echo chambers, the question remains: What is the influence of 
social media on echo chambers relative to other types of online news consumption (directly 
accessing a news source, search engines, and news aggregators). Furthermore, there is recognition 
that those that rely on social media are not representative of the general population, thus the extent 
to which social media echo chambers are representative of news exposure in the population is 
questionable (Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015; Mellon & Prosser, 2017). 
Comparing online and offline news consumption, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) demonstrate 
that selectivity leading to ideological segregation is stronger in online news than in offline news 
consumption, but weaker relative to face-to-face communication (or what those relying on social 
media refer to as echo chambers). In order to make these comparisons, Gentzkow and Shapiro 
(Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2011) assess the extent to which browsing histories (data comprised of the 
URLs users click during online browsing) of users are balanced in terms of the domains that are 
accessed compared to individual level data from surveys about offline news consumption and face-
to-face interactions. There are a number of forces that limit selection into ideological echo chambers: 
Most online news consumption is limited to centrist domains and users visit many sites (combining 
centrist and extreme in some cases) (p 1802).  
Flaxman et al. (2016) also using detailed information on browsing histories, are able to provide a 
more nuanced understanding of the conditions under which online news consumption contributes 
to echo chamber effects. Similar to Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011), they find that most online news 
consumption results from individuals directly accessing mainstream news outlets. Thus, given that 
offline media is comprised mostly of mainstream news outlets, online patterns of news consumption 
are remarkably similar to offline patterns (Flaxman et al., 2016). These direct means of access display 
less segregation than news reached via social media or search engines. It is unclear whether the 
relatively high degree of segregation via search engines results from algorithmically generated news 
feeds or user selectivity. However, the conclusion is that search engines, by whatever process, do 
contribute to increased segregation to a similar extent as news sharing on social media.  
These two studies analyzing browsing histories (clickstream data) focus on an analysis of the 
domains visited to measure ideological segregation and echo chambers. Both studies (Flaxman et 
al., 2016; Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2011) rely on a similar method for classifying the ideological 
orientations of these domains—the average ideological orientations of those visiting the URLs. 
While this allows ideological classification of a large number of URLs that would otherwise be 
impossible, we argue that to capture possible segregation or, on the other hand, homophily among 
news consumers it is necessary to look beyond the domain. Individuals consume stories rather than 
domains. And so, the pattern uncovered, that a majority of individuals visit a variety of domains, 
may reflect the behaviour that users follow a story rather than visiting specific domains. 
Furthermore, the measure of ideology used for URLs may be generated by the browsing behaviour 
itself rather than reflecting the ideological content of the news stories. Gentzkow and Shapiro  (2011), 
in a robustness check, suggest that segregation at the story level does not vary much from 
segregation at the domain level (p. 1827-28), However, this is based on examining patterns of URL 
views during top news events.  
Thus, we argue that to fully understand news consumption it is important to take into account 
the following: 1) capture online browsing rather than social media sharing due to the 
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unrepresentativeness of a social media only sample; 2) account for the content of news stories 
consumed rather than rely exclusively on domain views; and 3) have independent survey-based 
measures of attitudes. In the below section, we describe the study design we employ that integrates 
respondent browsing history data with a three-wave survey panel. Our analytical strategy is to 
describe patterns of news exposure among groups of respondents identified by their expressed 
preference on the EU referendum. Thus, we take a descriptive account of news consumption 
patterns that we believe is also in the spirit of the earlier work seeking to understand variation in 
news consumption patterns across platforms, means of access, and subgroups of the population.  
2. The Case of Brexit 
We examine news consumption during the UK’s 2016 EU Referendum. Public debates and first 
academic contributions have converged, at least initially, on a dominant interpretation of the Brexit 
vote as a vote of: the ‘left behind’, the ‘outsiders’, and, overall, an outcome of the losers from 
globalization (Antonucci, Horvath, Kutiyski, & Krouwel, 2017; Goodwin & Heath, 2016; Hobolt, 
2016). These studies have found that while the “Leave” vote reflects the lack of opportunities across 
the country, the profile of “Leave” voters is not homogeneous, both with respect to education 
(Goodwin & Heath, 2016) and to socio-economic conditions (Swales, 2016). This vote appears to be 
less socially uniform than the popular coverage would concede. However, the socio-economic and 
psycho-social factors that made voting “Leave” appealing for an ample segment of the British 
population are still being explored (Vasilopoulou & Wagner, 2017).  
Research on the media in the referendum campaign also suggests that understanding the 
interplay between and consumption of both traditional and social media is necessary. Media 
coverage during the referendum campaign was characterized as ‘divisive and acrimonious’, 
dominated by party leaders, with the economy as the most frequently mentioned topic, and populist 
undertones used by outlets that supported the “Leave” side (Moore & Ramsay, 2017). On social 
media, Twitter analysis showed the “Leave” side was more prominent than the voice of “Remain” 
(Llewellyn & Cram, 2016).  
There is ongoing research on the links between the coverage of the campaign in the traditional 
media, social media, and vote choice that draws on the relationship between media coverage and 
attitudes toward Europe. Based on this research, there are at least two ways by which media 
coverage could influence Brexit preferences. First, there is evidence that media coverage can directly 
influence support for EU integration (Vliegenthart, Schuck, Boomgaarden, Vreese, & H, 2008). 
Second, there may have been indirect effects of the media. Leader evaluations, in particular 
evaluations of the leaders of the “Leave” campaign (Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson) that were 
prominently featured (Clarke, Goodwin, & Whiteley, 2017), influenced the vote, and these 
evaluations tend to be driven partially by media coverage (Stevens & Karp, 2012).  
Our analysis makes three important contributions: First, in terms of the specific case of Brexit, 
our analysis will further understanding of how the news consumption patterns varied among 
“Leave” supporters, “Remain” supporters, and those who were undecided; Second, where previous 
studies of online news consumption have focused on the domain level, we extend our 
understanding of online news consumption beyond the domain to examine variation at the story 
level; Third, and more broadly, our analysis links online news exposure to respondent-reported 
attitudes in order to assess how polarization in news consumption is linked to attitude polarization. 
5 
 
Before moving to our results, we provide detail on the data collection, processing of our web 
browsing history data, and analysis of news stories.  
3. Data and Methods 
a. Measuring News Exposure with Surveys and Web Browsing Histories 
Some studies rely on self-reported news exposure via various platforms, and then compare how 
reported exposure to online, social media, and offline media exposure influences various outcomes 
(for example, (Mellon & Prosser, 2017)). However, self-reported measures tend to over-report some 
types of news exposure (Prior, 2009) and do not always capture news exposure via social media or 
searches. Other studies rely on social media exclusively to generate patterns of exposure and draw 
conclusions about selectivity (for example,(Bakshy et al., 2015). However, while social media has 
grown in terms of its prominence as a news platform, the majority of citizens still rely on traditional 
sources for news and increasingly reach these online (Perrin, 2015).  
Our data starts with ICM Research’s Reflected Life panel (as it offers distinct advantages for 
understanding networked online activity), allowing us to track online behaviour and model 
connections to both media content and other actors on the web. During the UK’s 2016 EU 
Referendum campaign, in collaboration with ICM, we conducted a large-n online survey of close to 
1,000 respondents over three waves. The survey was conducted by ICM Unlimited over three waves 
in 2016, February (3-8), April (22-6), and June (23-24), and included a total number of 1154 
respondents.2 The use of the survey data permits analysis of subgroups of the electorate based on 
attitudinal or socio-demographic measures.  
In addition to the three-wave panel, our research design includes capture of the digital footprint 
of respondents over 12 weeks (coinciding with survey field work periods) before the referendum. 
Members of the panel sample download an app that then tracks the URL of all websites visited, 
including via Facebook, which we code for content. In the online surveys, we also elicit self-reported 
social media use. Therefore, the panel allows us a detailed view of a large sample’s activity on social 
media over time, including exposure to information about the EU referendum, while also permitting 
us to compare online news consumption to expressed attitudes on the referendum.  
The clickstream data was collected between February 17 (three days before the EU referendum 
was announced) and June 23, 2016 (the day of the vote), for a total number of 3,310 users, 959 of 
which were also present in at least one of the survey panels. So, our analysis is based on the 959 
users for which we have survey data and online browsing histories. The data collection periods for 
the clickstream data are: 7-26 February, 15-30 April, and 1 May thru 23 June (all in 2016), which 
coincide with the fieldwork for the survey panel waves.3 For the analysis presented in this paper, we 
combine the three waves of the panel to classify respondents on the basis of referendum preferences.  
                                                     
2In the collection of the survey data, given panel attrition, ICM supplemented each wave with a 
new sample of respondents. Thus, the analysis is based on respondents who may have been in 
one, two. or all three of the waves. 
3The fieldwork dates for the survey are as follows: 3-8 February, 22-26 April, and 23-24 June. Thus, 
clickstream data was generally collected following February survey fieldwork and overlapped 
with the April and June survey fieldwork periods. 
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b. Clickstream/Browsing History Data Processing 
The web browsing data includes all the URL requests made by the user’s computer. Opening a 
new page generates a request which shows up as one URL in the data, but this request is 
accompanied by multiple others, generating URLs that correspond to adds, widgets, and trackers 
which are not relevant for our analysis. In fact, for every loaded page containing relevant 
information (such as a newspaper article), there are on average at least 10 other URLs loading at the 
same time in the clickstream data, which are irrelevant. Many of these URLs are on the same domain 
as the page of interest, so the challenge is being able to identify pages that contain articles and 
distinguish them from irrelevant URLs on the same domain.  
To achieve this goal, we started from a list of the most popular news domains, as identified by 
Alexa (an Amazon company that ranks websites by traffic and classifies them into multiple 
categories based on content). Within the "News" category, we selected websites which were placed 
in the "Newspapers", "Analysis and Opinion", "Breaking News", "Current Events", "Extended 
Coverage", "Internet Broadcasts", "Magazines and E-zines", "Journalism", and "Weblogs" sub-
categories, and then selected the top 400 domains in each news category as well as the top domains 
categorized by UK region. The total number of news domains considered was 4,179. Out of these, 
750 domains appeared in our web browsing history/clickstream data.  
We then visited each of these domains, manually coded whether the website contained news and 
information articles or not, and what the structure of URLs pointing to articles on the website was. 
Knowing the structure of links that point to articles allows us to write regular expressions that match 
all the possible articles on a domain, while excluding any other types of pages on that domain. Most 
news websites have a clear subdirectory structure that can be used for this purpose. For example, 
article pages on the Guardian website have the following structure:  
www.theguardian.com/section/year/month/day/article-title. 
We can, therefore, identify all the Guardian articles that show up in a user’s browsing history 
(and only articles) with the following general regular expression: 
www.theguardian.com/.+/\d{4}/\w{3}/\d{2}/.+. The coded news domains were further pruned 
to eliminate those that only included weather and other procedurally generated articles (such as 
traffic information, sports results, TV programming guides, stocks monitoring pages), news 
aggregation websites (such as Google and Yahoo News, Flipboard, etc.), videos without an attached 
article or description, and guides and how-to pages (recipes, reviews, self-diagnosis, travel guides, 
etc.), which left a total number of 508 domains.  
Finally, we merged the identified domains and articles on these domains with the survey data 
(i.e. the news stories clicked on by our sample of users). The resulting dataset includes a total number 
of 672 users and 332 domains, which correspond to 5,6289 user-article observations and is a subset 
of the 959 users for whom we have browsing histories. The original sample of 959 users with 
browsing histories is reduced by 287 respondents, because these respondents did not visit any of the 
news and information domains we identified in the initial step of our data processing. While 
respondents who did not view any news online are of interest when examining offline versus online 
news consumption, that comparison is beyond the scope of our current analysis. For comparison 
purposes, of those who viewed no news and information URLs 16% were undecided on Brexit and 
35% were “Leave” voters, while 16% of those who did view news URLs were undecided and 43% 
had a preference for “Leave”.  
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c. Topic Models 
To identify topics in our corpus of news stories, we rely on the latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) 
model developed in Blei et al. (2003). LDA is a hierarchical Bayesian model of text that assumes that 
each text in a corpus is a combination of a specific number of topics, and each topic is modelled as a 
distribution of words over the fixed vocabulary of the corpus. We estimate the model for 50 topics 
using Gensim (Řadim & Sojka, 2010) and compute average topic probabilities for each article.  
d. Full corpus vs. Brexit only 
We present results for a sub-corpus of articles that mention the EU Referendum in the text or the 
title (using multiple phrases and keywords to identify them, such as “Brexit”, “EU referendum”, 
“UK referendum”, etc.). In our corpus, 1,720 unique articles mention the referendum, and appear 
3,679 times in the user-click data. We estimate topic models for each of these two corpuses separately 
and repost average topic probabilities for each article.  
4. Results 
a. Online News Consumption 
Our approach is to provide a descriptive account of how segregated news consumption was 
during the Brexit campaign and to examine whether news selection generated echo chambers using 
web browsing data. In the current analysis, we are testing hypotheses about how these patterns of 
news consumption may have influenced preferences. Our analysis and results proceed in three 
steps: first, we examine the characteristics of the URLs visited during the campaign; second, we 
examine the topics of the news stories visited during the campaign by comparing topics of stories 
shared on social media to topics viewed by our users; third, we examine the network structure of 
the topics and domains.  
In Figure 1, we give a general description of the most visited domains during our final data 
collection period (1 May through 23 June, 2016) that corresponds to the seven weeks prior to the 
referendum vote. By a wide margin, with almost 2.5 times more visits than the next most visited site 
(in particular when combined with BBC.com), the BBC was the most visited online news domain 
during the campaign period. When examining the stories themselves, the most visited stories were 
the summary updates of the EU referendum campaign. Thus, the BBC provides a common source 
of information and is an important force against segmentation and polarization in news 
consumption behaviour. The other most visited sites represent offline news brands and the only 
online only (digital native) domain to fall in the top 20 sites is HuffingtonPost.com. Therefore, online 
versions of offline news outlets are heavily favoured. There are also a number of local news domains 
that appear in the list of top sites. The Manchester Evening News (part of the Guardian family) 
features prominently in the list, surprisingly, with more views than the Guardian. We have dropped 
a single user who was an outlier, and verified that Manchester as a region was not overrepresented 
in our online survey. Upon further checking, it appears as if the traffic to the Manchester paper is 
partly driven by links to the Guardian.  
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Figure 1. Total Traffic to Online News Domains During EU Referendum Campaign. These data are based 
on total traffic to identified news/information domains during the 7 Weeks prior to Referendum Vote (1 
May - 23 June, 2016) n = 672 users. 
One of the other features of the browsing history data we are using to measure online exposure 
allows us to evaluate the domains visited by other characteristics. One of these features of concern 
is whether the news and information domains can be classified as "fake news". Prior to reducing the 
domains to known news and information URLs, we checked the list of all domains against a 
database of known fake news sites.4 Contrary to impressions regarding the spread of fake news via 
social media and online sharing, there were only four instances of visits to one of the listed fake 
news sites. The phenomenon of “fake news” may be more prominent in the USA.  
Given that public broadcasting consumed a large share of news browsing, does other news 
consumption show patterns of ideological segregation? We initially used a method of identifying 
domains as left-leaning or right-leaning as employed by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) and Flaxman 
                                                     
4The list we relied on was compiled by Lisa Friedland, Kenny Joseph, Nir Grinberg, and David Lazer from 
NULab at Northeastern University. The list includes almost 500 “fake news” sources (websites) which have 
been aggregated from existing lists (Hoaxy, BuzzFeed, Media Bias Fact Check, etc.) and verified. The list is 
updated regularly. 
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et al.(2016). In order to adjust for the British media market, we used the BBC as our benchmark for 
a centrist position. We coded domains that had a higher proportion of Labour users than the BBC as 
to the left and those domains with a lower proportion of Labour voters as to the right of the BBC. 
However, even after this adjustment, this coding procedure produced some anomalies in our data. 
The Telegraph, using the measure of partisan leaning based on the partisan makeup of visitors, is to 
the left of the BBC, as 55% of users who clicked on the Telegraph were Labour voters in GE2015. 
While The Telegraph is a broadsheet and often considered a ’newspaper of record’, its editorial 
board has links to the Conservative party, and it has been loyal to the Conservative Party in terms 
of its editorial stance and election endorsements. Therefore, the fact that it would be considered to 
the left of the BBC on this partisan measure suggests our scale does not reflect content. One of the 
other main Conservative tabloids, The Sun, is also coded as a left-leaning online source as 59% of its 
viewers voted for Labour in 2015. Thus the readership, or visitors to news domains, does not reflect 
the editorial leaning of the paper and what we have observed in past studies about the content. The 
finding that online visitors to newspaper sites do not reflect the established editorial stance of the 
newspaper is particularly surprising in the UK, where there is a strong tradition of a partisan press. 
Consequently, utilizing users of online news domains to identify the ’ideology’ of a domain may 
present issues in other contexts as well.  
Therefore, rather than relying on user-defined measures, we have classified domains by their 
endorsements of political parties in the past general election (GE2015). Using this measure does 
limit the number of domains for analysis, as we can classify only a subset of newspapers.5 
However, we do see in Figure 1 that most of the top visited sites were newspapers. Furthermore, 
using coding of newspaper URLs by endorsements allows us to examine any potential polarization 
in news consumption by referendum position. We report the average number of clicks on right-
leaning and left-leaning news URLs in Figure 2.  
We have classified respondents in our survey as either supporting "Leave" or "Remain" (or 
undecided) based on responses to a question about intended vote in the EU referendum (or how 
they would vote if a referendum were held which was asked in February 2016 prior to 
announcement of the referendum). If a respondent appears multiple times in the survey we have 
taken the response most proximate to the referendum elections. Among “Remain” supporters, 
averaging the number of views across the right and left leaning newspaper URLs, left-leaning 
newspaper URLs are only slightly more visited than right-leaning. However, among “Leavers” there 
is a larger gap between clicking on left versus right-leaning newspaper URLs—showing a higher 
level of news consumption segregation by "Leavers". They are significantly more likely to view 
right-leaning newspaper URLs. Among those who remained undecided, we see that they were also 
more likely to visit right-leaning newspaper URLs, but visited them less frequently than "Leavers’. 
We do note that more newspaper URLs fall into the right-leaning group, which contributes to the 
pattern that all groups of respondents visited right-leaning newspaper URLs at approximately the 
same rates. Where the difference lies is in how frequently the groups visited left-leaning newspaper 
URLs, with “Leavers” and “Undecided” respondents having less balanced consumption patterns. 
We should note we are not making claims about the nature of news consumption on attitudes about 
                                                     
5We classify the Sun, Daily Mail, The Telegraph, The Daily Express, and The Standard as right-leaning, and 
The Guardian and the Daily Mirror as left-leaning. 
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the EU referendum, but only showing how news consumption patterns vary across users grouped 
by referendum preferences.  
 
Figure 2. Average Number of Visits to Newspaper URLs by Partisan Slant (identified by endorsements. 
Note that we identified The Sun, The Daily Mail, Telegraph, The Express as right-leaning, and the 
Guardian and the Daily Mirror as left-leaning. Y-axis is the average number of visits per user.) 
b. Topics at the Domain versus Story Level 
The above analysis is only based on newspaper domains that have identifiable editorial stances 
and could be coded as left- or right-leaning. However, beyond the news domains, we have also 
coded the topics of the news stories read (or clicked on) by respondents in our survey. Past studies, 
as in our above analysis, have relied on domain visits rather than actual news stories to measure 
exposure. But as we argue above, it is important to understand segregation in news topics. Our 
analysis of the domains clicked on during the campaign show that some domains, such as the BBC, 
have a broad reach across all respondents. However, the question remains as to whether these users 
are reading stories about the same topics. For example, in the Brexit debate, the “Leave” campaign 
tended to focus on the negative impact of EU membership on immigration and transfers to the EU. 
Did “Leave” voters also tend to read stories about these topics? In Figure 3, we utilize the data 
generated from extracting topics from the news stories that our respondents clicked on during our 
period of capturing browsing histories. Figure 3 shows the distribution of topics viewed by our 
survey respondents.  
To think about clustering, we first look at which topics were given more weight by each group of 
“Leave”, “Remain”, and “Undecided” respondents. As a result, we are able to detect any segregation 
in the topics of the news stories to which individuals selected to view, rather than relying on the 
domains to detect segregation. Of the 50 topics extracted from news stories mentioning Brexit, 29 
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topics had higher associations with “Leave” voters, 21 with “Remain”, and no topics were associated 
with “Undecided”. Those respondents who supported the “Leave” side had a higher probability of 
viewing news stories where immigration was a dominant topic. “Remain” voters, on the other hand, 
had the highest probability of viewing stories where Jo Cox featured (a pro-Remain Labour MP who 
was murdered by a man associated with the far-right, anti-immigrant organization Britain First). 
While we have identified which topics tend to be associated with the “Leave” or “Remain” 
supporters, one of the main conclusions to be drawn is that there is still a great degree of overlap in 
topics associated with both groups of supporters. In contrast, immigration, single market/trade, 
internal Conservative Party divisions on Brexit, economic impact, and the polls are five topics where 
there are the biggest differences between the two groups’ average probabilities of viewing stories 
with those topics.  
Figure 3. Topic popularity among Leave, Remain, and Undecided Respondents 
c. Structure of Users: Domains and Topics 
In order to compare the degree of segregation at the story and domain levels, we turn next to the 
relationships among the respondents, the domains they clicked on, and the topics in the articles 
sourced from the domains. Figure 4 shows the same sets of topics as in Figure 3, but using a network 
analysis to show the relationships of the topics to the individual user (a) and to the domain (b). Thus 
in (a) we can examine whether groups of users as identified by EU referendum preferences are 
clicking on the same topics, and in (b) we can examine whether news domains, with similar profiles 
of readers, are reporting on the same topics. To make the images readable, all ties to topics that were 
lower than .2 (a 20 percent confidence level from the model) were removed. Additionally, any topics, 
respondents, or domains without any resulting ties were also removed. The respondents are 
coloured by their support for “Remain” and “Leave”, and the domains by the percentage of their 
supporters in favour of “Remain” or “Leave”. Topics are represented by triangles. If Leavers were 
all reading the same topics, for example, we should see in (a) the red circles (“Leavers”) linked to 
the same topics (triangles) with no yellow circles (“Remainers”) connected to these triangles. 
Likewise, in (b) if domains read mostly by “Leavers” were focused on a set of topics, then we should 
see the blue circles clustered around a set of triangles. What is evident in Figure 4 for the respondents 
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shown in (a) is that there is no clustering of topics by whether they supported “Leave”, “Remain”, 
or were “Undecided”. Wherever multiple domains or multiple readers are linked to a particular 
topic, that topic has a mixed readership without any clear signs of polarization.  
 
 
(a) Respondents  
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 (b) Domains  
 
Figure 4. Networks of topics by survey respondents (a) and domains (b) 
If there was a clear clustering of topics by vote, we would expect that “Leave” voters mostly read 
those topics associated with ‘Leave’, and the same for “Remain” voters. We can express this as a 
block model [?], where each ‘block’ consists of “Leave”, “Remain”, and “Undecided” voters in the 
rows, and then “Leave” or “Remain” predominantly associated topics in the columns. This idealized 
image is shown in Figure 5 (a), with the empirical values of the association of the average reader to 
each type of topic (b). The z-scores in (b) are estimated with a permutation test conditioning on the 
distribution of emphases on topics. Thus, compared to a world where people randomly clicked on 
topics (with the same weight as in the empirical data), we see some different results based on 
“Leave”, “Remain”, and “Undecided” categories. “Leave voters significantly click on 
predominantly ‘Leave’ topics more than expected (a z-score more than 2 or less than -2 is considered 
significantly positive or negative, respectively), and were significantly less likely to click on a 
‘Remain’ topic—showing evidence of clustering. In the case of “Remain” readers, they were not 
significantly associated with clicking on either ‘Leave’ or ‘Remain’ associated topics. ‘Undecided’ 
respondents were significantly less likely than our randomized null model to click on either type of 
topic. This reinforces what is clear in Figure 4; some topics are vastly more popular among “Leave” 
voters without the same being true of “Remain” supporters. Even though immigration was a likely 
topic for both sides and a larger percentage of “Remain” supporters clicked on articles that were 
associated with this topic (24% vs 18%), once weighting was taken into account—in other words the 
strength of the association between each article and topic—”Leave” then had a much higher 
association with the topic of immigration than “Remain” voters (47% tie on average to 27%).  
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Figure 5. Comparing Clustering: Block Models 
5. Conclusions 
One of the most salient questions facing established democracies is how the internet has 
disrupted the flows of communication that keep democracies vibrant (Sunstein, 2004). We address 
this question by seeking to understand online news consumption by directly observing how 
individuals select and view articles online, rather than relying on the patterns of sharing news stories 
on social media platforms. These direct observations have already yielded important insights about 
the relatively polarizing effects of directly accessing news domains versus social media sharing 
(Flaxman et al., 2016), and online versus traditional media versus face-to-face contact (Gentzkow & 
Shapiro, 2011). Our contribution moves the debate a step further by drilling down to the story level 
and linking this information to direct observations of attitudes collected via an online panel survey.  
Our results highlight three conclusions. First, and similar to the recent research in the USA, we 
show a great degree of overlap in news consumption rather than segregation. In terms of popular 
URLs, we see that, for example, the BBC—a public broadcasting outlet—was the most visited URL 
during the Brexit campaign. Therefore, there is a great deal of shared information. Furthermore, by 
linking web browsing histories with survey responses on political preferences, we see that it was 
the “Leave” voters who demonstrated a more segregated pattern of news consumption than either 
“Remain” voters or “Undecided”. This provides a useful condition to our understanding of the 
polarizing effect of online news consumption; it may only be present for segments of the population. 
 Second, the online news environment has the potential to stem polarizing forces in the structure of 
the media ecosystem. One of the defining features of the UK media system is the strength of the 
partisan press. Indeed, in studies of voting behaviour, a citizen’s chosen newspaper is a strong 
predictor of partisanship and vote choice. However, through examining online news exposure we 
see that current online news communities show a great deal of overlap—i.e. left-leaning (or 
“Remain”) voters click across a range of domains including a number of right-leaning (and pro-
“Leave”) online newspapers (The Sun, The Telegraph). For this reason, we also note that measuring 
URL ideology by user ideology does present some concerns outside of the USA. This measure of the 
partisan slant of URLs—estimated through the proportion of users who are Labour supporters—
yielded results that were inconsistent with content-based measures of ideological slant. However, 
generally our research is consistent with the conclusion that online news exposure alone does not 
drive ideological segregation.  
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Third, our methodological approach shows the advantages of extending the analysis of web 
browsing history data to the news story level. Previous studies into the extent of polarization and 
segregation in news consumption have relied on analyzing domains, and this may underestimate 
the extent of segregation in patterns of news consumption. As above, there is a great deal of overlap 
in domains accessed. While we find a great deal of commonality in the networks of news exposure 
even at the story level, there appears to be more segregation at the story level than the domain level.  
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